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Research Questions
• Many issues in state politics require preference 
estimates for constituents, legislators, and 
governors
– Legislator responsiveness
– Impact of initiatives
– Committee outliers 
– Power of governors
• What is the best methodology for estimating 
preferences given the spatial model of voting?   
2Coding – Arizona 44th Legislature
• Substantive coding of I&R vs. Roll Calls
– Proposition 203 (2000) general election would 
mandate English-only instruction in Arizona 
public schools 
– HB 2387 in the 44th Legislature, 1st Regular 
session provides for bilingual education.
– County vote for Proposition 203 as a “nay”
vote on HB 2387 and vice versa. 
• Similar for governors
Statistical Model
• Logit model with the probability of a “yea”
vote as a function of an unobserved 
regressor, the ideal point of actor I
• zij = αj + βjθi + eij
– item response model with “difficulty”
parameter αj and “discrimination” parameter βj. 
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Identification
• Bayesian setup (e.g., Martin and Quinn 
2003; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2003; 
Trier 2003; Bailey 2004)
– Diffuse priors of N(0,25) on bill parameters
– “Spike priors” of N(-1,.000001) for known 
liberal legislators, N(1, .000001) for known 
conservative legislators
– N(0,1) on other legislators
• Very little information in these priors
4Posterior Density Summary of Ideal 
Points, Governor & Counties
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Preference Estimates vs. a Scale of Interest 
Group Endorsements
Comparison of Interest Group Endorsements and Ideology Estimates
y = -0.0174x2 - 0.1271x + 0.5422
R2 = 0.5811
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5Preference Estimates vs. Scores from the 
Arizona League of Conservation Voters
Comparison of Conservation League Scores and Ideology Estimates
y = -0.0083x + 0.8139
R2 = 0.5169
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Preference Estimates vs. Scores from the 
National Federal of Independent Businesses
Comparison of National Federation of Independent Business scores to Ideology Estimates
y = 0.0135x - 0.4066
R2 = 0.6119
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6Preference Estimates vs. the 
District Minority Percent 
Comparison of District Minority Percent and Ideology Estimates
y = -0.0127x + 0.8654
R2 = 0.3499
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Comparison of Preference Estimates and 
Bush’s Vote Share in the District
Comparison of Bush District Vote Share and Ideology Estimates 
y = 2.3534x - 0.6616
R2 = 0.3838
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7Next Steps
• Agenda Considerations 
• Estimate District Level Ideal Points 
• Expand Data to 1994
• Examine Voters vs Legislator Ideal Points
• Test Formal Models 
• Other States 
